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BIFURCATING FLORIDA'S CAPITAL TRIALS:
TWO STEPS ARE BETTER THAN ONE
INTRODUGnION

BY HONORABLE RIIcHARD

KELLY*

[l]t is fundamentally necessary in order to insure a defendant due process
and to guaranteehim a fair trial of the two issues, guilt and recommendation
of mercy, that there be separate consideration thereof by the jury.1
Since everything that is not divine is imperfect, it is neither unusual nor
rare that an anomalous situation exists in the criminal trial practice in Florida. Moreover, it is not odd that the discrepancy involves the most dramatic
responsibility imposed on our trial procedures. The amazing fact is that
the legal profession has come to accept this anomalous procedure as normal.
This is true even though the incongruity must affront all but the least profound.
Florida's jury trial procedures in criminal cases are based upon the premise that the only purpose of the trial is determination of the question of
guilt or innocence of the accused. This does not comport with reality, however, as in jury trials involving capital punishment the jury also determines
the question of sentence.
In all noncapital cases, on the other hand, Florida's trial judges are responsible for determining the sentence. They have at their disposal a broad
spectrum of information, including presentence investigation reports, FBI
identification records, hearsay, and gossip, as well as personal opinions from
a variety of people including the victim, ex parte discussions with law enforcement officials, pleas for mercy from fathers, mothers, wives, and pastors.
Additionally, the defendant is permitted reasonable latitude to make such
direct plea to the court for leniency as his personality, experience, and sincerity
will permit.
To deny that these factors have an impact on the sentencing court would
certainly be an additional avoidance of reality. 2 To say that the court places
little or no reliance on information of this quality makes a mockery of a
significant process provided for in the law and honored by custom and
daily use.
Any serious suggestions that judges limit the resources they utilize in
determining a sentence to information gleaned during the .trial on the question of guilt would be considered impractical. There would be irate resistance from the judiciary on the ground that the more the sentencing judge
knows and the more factors considered, the more likely it becomes that he
will arrive at an appropriate sentence.
By contrast, a jury in a capital case is faced with the awesome responsibility of determining life or death - the ultimate question of penalty. They
are required by Florida's present practice to make this decision with only
* Judge, Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida.
1.

Craig v. State, 179 So. 2d 202, 208 (Fla. 1965) (dissenting opinion).

2. See note 201 infra.
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the information available during trial, the scope of which is limited by
formal rules of evidence to that which is germane to the question of guilt.
In many or most cases, the jury has virtually no opportunity to gain any
insight or knowledge regarding the defendant's background, good or bad;
frequently the jurors never hear the defendant speak. It is not unexpected
that when lawyers and judges evaluate and determine procedures for the
courts, the layman's role is seldom appreciated or adequately considered.
The current practice regarding the jury's sentencing responsibility in capital
cases is a prime example of this communication gap.
The survival of our system of justice, and likely our whole governmental
philosophy, depends upon the public's satisfaction with the capacity of the
system to render justice. Like beauty, justice is subjective. The system and
those entrusted with its operation are always on trial. If the procedures and
the resulting justice are not understood and appreciated by the individual
and do not pass the demanding test of common sense, the danger is farreaching. The quest for justice is a basic human drive. The social system
either satisfies this need, changes, or passes on.
A jury, charged with the responsibility of the defendant's life or death,
must feel something less than satisfaction in facing the task with so many
unanswered questions regarding the defendant. An imperceptible toll must
be taken as the years and trials go by and the jurors feedback to the people
in general this sense of doubt and imperfection.
The purpose of this note is to deal with this apparent anomaly in Florida
and to urge an obvious solution.
JURY DETERMINATION OF PUNISHMENT

At common law, the power to sentence was vested solely in the judiciary3
However, every state,4 except those that have abolished the death penalty,
now delegates responsibility for determining punishment in capital cases6 to
the jury.6

3.

See generally S. RUBIN, Ts

LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRCr[ON 122 & n.52

(1963);

NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAw OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

23-28 (1931); Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REv. 968, 970-72 (1967).
4. See Handler, Background Evidence in Murder Cases, 51 J. CRM. L.C. & P.S. 317, 317
& n.6, 318 & nn. 7, 8 (1960); Note, supra note 3, at 968 & n.l.
5. A number of states delegate the responsibility of determining punishment in all
criminal cases to the jury. For a list and discussion of these state statutes see Note, supra
note 3, at 968, 969 n.2. See also S. RUBIN, supra note 3, at 122-23; Note, On Modernizing
Missouri's Criminal Punishment Procedure, 20 U. KAN. Crrv L. REv. 299 (1952).
6. The view has been expressed that statutes giving the jury discretion to choose
between death and imprisonment "are basically in mitigation of the capital penalty rather
than a reflection of the orientation that gives general sentencing power to juries." S. RUBIN,
supra note 3, at 123-24. This is apparently the view taken in Florida. See Wilson v. State,

225 So. 2d 321, 323-24 (Fla. 1969). See also Thomas v. State, 92 So. 2d 621, 625 (Fla. 1957),
wherein the court states: "[jT]he court and not the jury determines the punishment when

the jury recommends mercy." This distinction, however, appears to be an exercise in
semantics. Whether the process is labeled "jury mitigation" or "jury sentencing," the
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The arguments in favor of jury sentencing are quite different from the
reasons suggested for its original implementation. Initially, the colonists
were prompted to delegate more responsibilities to criminal juries because
of "bad experiences" with the royal judges in England and the absence of
"substantial difference[s] in training, competence, experience or intelligence
between judge and jury."- This delegation evolved" to the point where juries
in Florida are now the sole arbiters of punishment in capital cases. 9 In
Florida, upon a recommendation of mercy by a majority of the jurors, the
court must sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.' 0 Without such recommendation the penalty is automatically death.",
While the merits of jury sentencing as opposed to sentencing by a judge
are beyond the scope of this note, 2 the major advantages and disadvantages
of each should be briefly enumerated.
Proponents of a system whereby the judge would be solely responsible
for sentencing point to the expertise and experience that most judges possess.' s It is also contended that "judicial determinations are likely to be less
emotional or prejudiced than those of juries,"'1 as well as more uniform
than sentences imposed by juries.15

jurors are the sole arbiters of whether the defendant will be sentenced to death or imprisonment.
7. NATioNAL CoMM'N ON LAW OBsEmvAwcE AND ENFORCEmr, supra note 3, at 27.
8. The earliest statutory authorization for capital juries to recommend mercy in Florida
appeared in 1868. Fla. Laws 1868, ch. 1637 (18), §8.
9. FLA. STAT. §921.141 (Supp. 1970) provides: "A defendant found guilty by a jury of
an offense punishable by death shall be sentenced to death unless the verdict includes a
recommendation to mercy by a majority of the jury. When the verdict includes a recommendation to mercy by a majority of the jury, the court shall sentence the defendant to
life imprisonment. A defendant found guilty by the court of an offense punishable by
death on a plea of guilty or when a jury is waived shall be sentenced by the court to
death or life imprisonment."
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See generally S. RUrN, supra note 3, at 122-28 (discussion of the merits of jury
sentencing); NATIONAL COXMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 3, at
23-28; Trm Pa samr's COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINIsrRATION OF JUsTnCE,

TASK FORaC RzPORT: THE CouRTs 26 (1967); La Font, Assessment of Punishment-A Judge
or Jury Function?, 38 TExAs L. REv. 835 (1960); Note, supra note 5, at 299; Note, supra
note 3, at 968; Comment, Consideration of Punishment by Juries, 17 U. Cm. L. REv. 400
(1950).
13. See Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101'U. PA. L. REv.
1099, 1127 (1953). One observer has noted: "[A]lthough the education and experience of
the average juror has increased, his knowledge of the relevant social sciences, of the effects
of imprisonment, and of the purpose of punishment remains as meager as it ever was."
Note, supra note 5, at 299, 301. Compare F. FRANKFURTER, OF LAw AND MEN 87 (1956): "I
do not understand the view that juries are not qualified to discriminate between situations
calling for mitigated sentences."
14. MODEL PENAL CODE §201.6, Comment 4 (rent. Draft No. 9, 1959). See also La Font,
supra note 12, at 842-43.
15. MODEL PENAL CoDE §201.6, Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). See also Note,
supra note 3, at 981-82. While it may be true that jury sentencing does not promote uniform punishment, it is questionable whether judicial sentencing accomplishes this to any
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On the other hand, advocates of jury sentencing contend that capital

16
punishment "should reflect the judgment of a cross section of the public"'

and that the judge should not "bear the sole responsibility for making
this grave decision."'2 It is also contended that jury sentencing minimizes
verdict nullification by providing jurors with an outlet to express dissatisfaotion with statutory sentences.'8 Moreover, it is suggested that "jurors
do not become calloused to the fate of defendants"'19 as readily as judges
20
and that jurors are less likely to yield to political and public pressures.
But whatever may be said of the advantages of jury sentencing, it manifests
one inherent deficiency: "[J]ury sentencing makes it difficult to obtain a
sentencing decision based on adequate background information about the
defendant."

2
1

BACKGROUND

EVIDENCE IN FLORIDA

In Donald v. State22 the defendant was on trial for a noncapital felony
and attempted to introduce into evidence the circumstances underlying his
previous convictions for forgery.23 These mitigating circumstances included

the facts that he had a wife and three children; that he was a church member and a war veteran; and that he had been unemployed and without
money. Consequently, "in a moment of desperation he forged and negotiated
two checks . . . to obtain food for his hungry wife and children."' 24 The
court refused to allow this evidence to be introduced, saying:25
These matters were clearly immaterial and irrelevant on the issue of
guilt or innocence ...

but they would be pertinent factors for the trial

court's consideration at the time of sentencing.
The Florida supreme court has promulgated two rules of criminal procedure 26 that allow for mitigating or aggravating circumstances to be pregreater extent. For a recent study of judicial sentencing disparities in Florida see Note,
Appellate Review of Sentences in Florida: A Proposal, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 736 (1971).

16. Note, supra note 3, at 969.
17. Id.
18. Note, The Two Trial System in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 50, 52 (1964). See
note 179 and accompanying text infra. See also Note, supra note 3, at 989.
19.

Tm PRasmEr's COMM'N ON

LAW

ENFORCEMENT

AND

ADMINISTRATION

OF JUsTICE,

supra note 12. See also Note, supra note 3, at 989-91.
20. Note, supra note 3, at 989.
21.

THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

supra note 13. See also La Font, supra note 12, at 837-42; Note, supra note 3, at 989-91;
text accompanying notes 201-204 infra.
22. 166 So. 2d 453 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
23. Prior to the instant case the defendant had been found guilty of forgery in four
separate cases. In the instant case the defendant was appealing a conviction for felonious
escape from confinement. Id. at 454-55.
24. Id. at 456-57 n.3.

25. Id. at 457.
26. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.780; FLA. R. CuM. P. 1.790 (a). In addition to these two rules,
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.720 provides for "allocution," a common law procedure whereby the
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sented to the court in cases such as Donald.In a capital case, however, neither
of these devices is applicable.27 Consequently, had Donald been a capital
case the defendant would have been unable to point out to the jury the
mitigating circumstances that the court termed "pertinent" to the issues
of sentencing and punishment.
Although jurors must determine punishment in capital cases, the only
evidence upon which they can determine an appropriate sentence is that
introduced during trial on the issue of guilt or innocence. Evidence relevant
solely to punishment is inadmissible.28 Thus, evidence that might go to
defendant is "asked by the court if he has anything to offer why judgment should not
be awarded against him." 4 W. BLACKSrONE COMMENTARIS *375. At common law the device
was not used "to elicit mitigating evidence.., but to give the defendant a formal opportunity to present one of the strictly defined legal reasons which required the avoidance or
delay of sentencing." Note, Procedural Due Process at judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81
HAsv. L. REV. 821, 832-33 (1968). See generally Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo. L. Rxv. 115, 232
(1944). In Florida the common law meaning of allocution has been preserved in FL. R.
CRIM. P. 1.720. But see Perkins v. State, 228 So. 2d 382, 394 (Fla. 1969). In Florida, as at
common law, the only grounds that a defendant may allege in his allocutionary statement
are: "(a) That he has become insane since pleading guilty or nolo contendere or since
being found guilty by the court or by the verdict of a jury; (b) That he has been pardoned
of the offenses for which he is about to be sentenced; (c) That he is not the same person
against whom the verdict or finding of the court or judgment was rendered; (d) If the
defendant is a woman, and the sentence of death is to be pronounced, that she is pregnant." FLA. R. CRrn. P. 1.730. See also FLA. R. CRim P. 1.740-.770 for an explanation of
these four grounds. Not only is general mitigating evidence inadmissible under Florida's
allocutionary procedure, but "failure to ask a criminal defendant whether he has any
cause why sentence should not be pronounced is not fundamental error." Sands v. State,
202 So. 2d 141, 142 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967). But see Wellington v. State, 226 So. 2d 432
(2d D.C.. Fla. 1969).
27. See text accompanying notes 47-55 infra.

28. See Campbell v. State, 227 So. 2d 873, 877 (Fla. 1969). Several states have taken a
position contrary to the one presently followed in Florida. Keirsey v. State, 131 Ark. 487,
199 S.W. 532 (1917); State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 (1953); State v. Henry, 196
La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940), rev'd on other grounds, 197 La. 999, 3 So. 2d 104 (1941); State
v. Brown, 60 Wyo. 379, 151 P.2d 950 (1944). See also Fields v. State, 47 Ala. 603 (1872);

Fletcher v. People. 177 Ill. 184, 7 N.E. 80 (1886); Harris v. Commonwealth, 183 Ky. 542,
209 S.W. 509 (1919).
Other states have adopted a policy similar to Florida's. Campbell v. Territory, 14 Ariz.
109, 125 P. 717 (1912) (hostile relationship between the defendant and the decedent);
Goosby v. State, 153 Ga. 496, 112 S.E. 467 (1922); State v. Schlaps, 78 Mont. 560, 254 P. 858

(1927) (state of mind).
The two states that best illustrate this policy conflict are New Jersey and Ohio. New
Jersey, in State v. Mount, 30 N.J. 195, 152 A.2d 343 (1959), held: "Mhe interests of justice
will be best served if our trial judges ... permit defendants in murder cases to introduce
. . . background evidence [relevant to punishment] within reasonable limitations." Id. at
218, 152 A.2d at 355. In direct contrast, an Ohio court, in Ashbrook v. State, 49 Ohio App.
298, 197 N.E. 214 (1935), also a capital case, held: "Mhe action of the jury in recommending or failing to recommend mercy is a matter entirely within their discretion. It is
not an issue in the case nor can evidence be introduced directed specifically toward a claim
for mercy." Id. at 302, 197 N.E. at 216. But see note 129 infra and accompanying text.
Florida's policy regarding evidence relevant solely to punishment can be easily identified
with this latter approach. For a discussion of background evidence see Handler, Backgroun4
Evidence in Murder Cases, 51 J. Cams, L.C. & P.S. $17 (1960).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1971

5

Florida Law
Review, Vol.
24,REVIEW
Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 7
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW

[Vol. XXIV

mitigation of punishment may not be considered by the jury. 29 In addition,
facts that may indicate the seriousness of the defendant's crime are also
inadmissible.30
The state is allowed some latitude in introducing evidence of guilt that
undoubtedly has a probative effect on the penalty question. Thus, while
it would appear that jurors in capital cases are wholly precluded from considering evidence that would enable an enlightened assessment of punishment, in a practical sense this is not completely true. For example, the state
may introduce evidence as to the manner in which the crime was committed.31 Similarly, in proving motive, evidence is admissible relating to the
previous relationship between the defendant and the deceased,3 2 between the
defendant and members of the deceased's family,3 3 and between the deceased
and members of the defendant's family.34 Moreover, the state may introduce
evidence to prove the defendant tried to evade arrest or flee from prosecution s5 or that he attempted a bribe after his arrest.30 On the other hand,
a defendant may not prove, either in mitigation of punishment or as indicative of innocence, that he voluntarily surrendered7 or made no attempt
to flee or escape.38 The state is also given an advantage under the res gestae
rule that allows for introduction of many of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the crime.39
Admission of evidence probative of motive or part of the res gestae of the
crime may indirectly apprise the jury of factors relevant to punishment.
However, evidence of character and prior criminal record are more likely
to influence the final penalty determination. Evidence of past crimes is generally inadmissible in Florida, however, unless the evidence has independent
relevance. Under no circumstances may it be used to show propensity to

29.

Young v. State, 140 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1962) (level of intelligence); Grissom v. State, 237

So. 2d 57 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Evans v. State, 140 So. 2d 348 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1962) (mental
defect short of legal insanity).
30. Gluck v. State, 62 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1952) (religion or recent employment); Young
v. State, 141 Fla. 529, 195 So. 569 (1939) (degenerated nature of a defendant's neighborhood); Rowe v. State, 120 Fla. 649, 163 So. 2d 22 (1935); Gibson v. State, 191 So. 2d 58
(1st D.CGA. Fla. 1966) (deceased left a family); Hathaway v. State, 100 So. 2d 662 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1958) (deceased was married).
31. Robinson v. State, 148 Fla. 153, 3 So. 2d 804 (1941); Hasty v. State, 120 Fla. 269, 162
So. 910 (1935); Waterman v. State, 119 Fla. 86, 163 So. 569 (1935).
32. Deeb v. State, 131 Fla. 362, 179 So. 894 (1937); Martin v. State, 68 Fla. 18, 66 So.
139 (1914); Maloy v. State, 52 Fla. 101, 41 So. 791 (1906); Ortiz v. State, 30 Fla. 256, 11

So. 611 (1892).
33.

Philips v. State, 88 Fla. 117, 101 So. 204 (1924); see, e.g., Childers v. State, 74 Fla.

288, 77 So. 99 (1917).
34. Collins v. State, 88 Fla. 578, 102 So. 880 (1925); Whidden v. State, 64 Fla. 165, 59
So. 561 (1912).
35. Mackiewicz v. State, 114 So. 2d 684, 689 (Fla. 1959).
36. Cortes v. State, 135 Fla. 589, 185 So. 323 (1938).
37. Carlton v. State, 63 Fla. 1, 58 So. 486 (1912).
38. Thomas v. State, 47 Fla. 99, 36 So. 161 (1904).
39. Powell v. State, 131 Fla. 254, 175 So. 213 (1937); see, e.g., Oliver v. State, 38 Fla.
46, 20 So. 803 (1896).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss1/7

6

Kaplan: Bifurcating Florida's Capital Trails: Two Steps are Better than O

197]

BIFURCATING FLORIDA'S CAPITAL TRIALS

commit crime.4° Evidence of past crimes is admissible, however, to identify
the accused4 ' or "to prove criminal intent, guilty knowledge, purpose, plan
or design, or to show that the act charged was not the result of accident,
mistake, or inadvertance."42
While evidence of past crimes undoubtedly tends to prejudice a defendant
in the jury's assessment of punishment, a defendant is allowed to introduce
evidence of good character and reputation in order to raise doubts as to his

culpability and, indirectly, to mitigate his punishment.48 Evidence of good
character must relate "to the trait involved in the offense with which the
defendant is charged," 44 however, and must be evidence of general character
rather than evidence of specific acts.4 5 Although it would initially appear
that introduction of character evidence would be advantageous to most defendants, once he puts his character into issue, the state may rebut with

evidence of bad character and past unrelated crimes.48

""

PROBLEMS INHERENT IN FLORIDA'S SINGLE STAGE PROCEDURE

Three distinct problems result from Florida's unitary trial procedure
whereby guilt and punishment are determined simultaneously. First, and
perhaps most important, both the defendant and the state are precluded
from introducing evidence that would enable the jury to make an informed
and individualized assessment of punishment 47 The two rules of criminal
procedure4s adopted by the Florida supreme court that permit introduction
of factors pertinent to sentencing and punishment are inapplicable in capital cases. The first rule -an "inquiry into mitigating or aggravating circumstances" 9° - is only applicable if "the court has discretion as to the penalty
to be infficted."'' 0 In capital cases, however, the jury, not the court, has this

40. San Fratello v. State, 154 So. 2d 327 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); see, e.g., Hooper v.
State, 115 So. 2d 769 (Sd D.CA. Fla. 1959).
41. San Fratello v. State, 154 So. 2d 327 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
42. Andrews v. State, 172 So. 2d 505, 506 (Ist DC.A. Fla. 1965). See also Shargaa v.
State, 102 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1958) (to connect two crimes as part of one transaction); Green
v. State, 190 So. 2d 42 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966) (to disprove a defense of alibi or entrapment);
Harris v. State, 183 So. 2d 291 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966) (evidence of past crimes is admissible to
show a general pattern of criminality).
43. See, e.g., Faulkner v. State, 146 Fla. 769, 1 So. 2d 857 (1941); Capello v. State, 82
Na. 346, 90 So. 192 (1921); Mitchell v. State, 43 Fla. 188, 30 So. 803 (1901).
44. Norman v. State, 156 So. 2d 186, 189 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963). See also Jordan v. State,
171 So. 2d 418 (Ist D.C.A. Fa.1965).

45. Cornelius v. State, 49 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1950).
46. Id. at 35.
47. This problem may be viewed in two ways: "[F]irst, information gained at the
proceeding to establish guilt is not a sufficient basis for the determination of sentence; and
secondly, information not available to the trial court is relevant and necessary in the
determination of sentence." Note, The Bifurcated Trial Procedurf wid First Degree Murder,
3 SuFroL U. L. Rrv. 628, 630 (1969).

48. See note 26 supra.
49.

FLA. R. COuM. P. 1.780.

50. Id.
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discretion 51 and consequently the defendant is precluded from utilizing this
device.52 The second rule, which provides for a presentence investigation
report, 3 is also inapplicable in capital cases. Such an investigation may only
be made where "probation is authorized by law," 54 thus precluding its use
when the offense is punishable by death. 5
Second, the jury is given no guidelines or standards by which to make
its penalty determination6 -"each juror is free to vote for mercy for any
reason at all."-6 Such unlimited discretion is a dispositive factor in creating
sentence disparities throughout the state 55 and effectively precludes appellate
5
review of death sentences.
Finally, if the defendant does offer character evidence through his own
testimony with the intention of influencing the jury on the penalty issue,
he is faced with the likelihood that the state will introduce evidence of past
crimes and bad character that may seriously prejudice him on the issue of
guilt.6 Consequently, the accused must either waive his constitutional
51. See FLA.

STAT.

§921.141 (Supp. 1970). See also Perkins v. State, 228 So. 2d 382,

394-95 (Fla. 1969) (Ervin, C.J., concurring specially); State v. Miller, 231 So. 2d 260, 262
(3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
52. If a defendant waives a jury trial, FLA. R. Cur. P. 1.260, or pleads guilty, FiA. R.
CiuM. P. 1.170, however, FLA. R. GuM. P. 1.780 is applicable and the court may conduct
an inquiry into mitigating and aggravating circumstances. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 123
So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1960).
53. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.790 (a).
54. Id.
55. FLA. STAT. §948.01(1) (1969).
56. For a discussion of possible jury guidelines see notes 182-194 and accompanying text
infra.
57. Wilson v. State, 225 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. 1969). See also Andres v. United States,
333 U.S. 740 (1938); Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303 (1899); Peterson v. State, 145
Fla. 466, 199 So. 753 (1941); Baker v. State, 137 Fla. 27, 188 So. 634 (1939); Metzger v. State,
18 Fla. 481 (1881).
58. See generally, Note, supra note 15.
59. In Florida, the failure of the jury to recommend mercy is not reviewable. Davis v.
State, 123 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1960); Peterson v. State, 145 la. 466, 199 So. 753 (1941). But see
Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 30 (Fla. 1959), stating: "[I]t is not enough that the proceedings
affecting guilt or innocence were proper, if the proceedings prejudiced the jury's determination of a recommendation to mercy." In Craig v. State, 179 So. 2d 202, 209 (Fla.
1965), Justice Ervin stated in his dissenting opinion: "The unreviewability of a non-recommendation of mercy in a guilty verdict mandatorily requiring a death penalty admittedly
gives me concern. Abuse of discretion by the jury, its bias and prejudice-if any- undue
restraints upon the admission of evidence and of information in the allocutionary showing
of a defendant before the jury as to why the death penalty should not be imposed upon
him, or other harmful unfairness or unreasonableness amounting to a denial of due process of law in a jury's determination whether the death penalty should be imposed in a
rape case, all should be reviewable by the trial judge and appellate courts." In order to
effectuate a meaningful policy of judicial review of death sentences, sentencing guidelines
and purpose should first be established in order to determine whether the jurors have
in fact deviated or adhered to the public policy of this state. See Perkins v. State, 228 So.
2d 382, 394-95 (Fla. 1969) (concurring opinion). See also notes 214-216 and accompanying
text infra.
60. See Craig v. State, 179 So. 2d 202, 206 (Fla. 1965) (dissenting opinion). See generally Handler, supra note 28, at 325-27.
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right against self-incrimination"1 or forego introducing character evidence. 62
While a defendant may offer character evidence through other witnesses63
and thus avoid incriminating himself, he thereby loses his right to the concluding argument before the jury. 64 Additionally, the defendant's character
witnesses may properly be cross examined about "rumors of particular and
specific charges of the commission of acts inconsistent with the character
which he was called to prove." 65 Thus, a defendant is likely to be prejudiced
whether or not he chooses to offer character evidence either through himself or another.66
THE BIFURCATED TRIAL: A SOLUTION

Six states, California,6 7 Connecticut,68 New York,6 9 Pennsylvania, 70
Texas, 7 and Georgia- 2 have attempted to eliminate the inequities inherent
in delegating penalty determination to jurors who have little or no evidence

61. U.S. CONSr. amend. V.
62. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); text accompanying notes 122131 infra.
63. See, e.g., Popps v. State, 120 Fla. 387, 162 So. 701 (1935).
64. F.&R. Cn. P. 1.250.
65. Cook v. State, 35 So. 665, 667 (Fla. 1903).
66. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948). If background evidence were
freely admissible, this prejudicial effect would still exist. See Handler, supra note 28, at 32527. Additionally, some jurors would probably become confused between the issues of guilt
and penalty and the trial might become submerged in collateral issues. See State v. Wise, 19
N.J. 59, 106, 115 A.2d 62, 87 (1955). See also Campbell v. State, 227 So. 2d 873, 877 (Fa.
1969). With evidence freely admissible on both guilt and penalty, some defendants would
face the possibility of being convicted because they had committed prior crimes while
others might be acquitted due to their respectable, trouble-free backgrounds. Moreover,
"[e]ven if the trial court took the liberal view and admitted the defendant's 'sentencing
evidence' adduced to show mitigating circumstances, the introduction of such evidence
directed solely at the punishment issue would certainly compromise the strength of defendant's assertion that he is innocent." Note, United States v. Jackson, The Possible Consequences of Impairing the Right to Trial by Jury, 22 RuvomEs L. REv. 167, 179-80 (1968).
67.

CAL. PENAL CODE §190.1 (West 1969).

68. Conn. Gen, Stat. Ann. §53-10 (1960). This section was repealed by 1969 Public
Act 828, §214, effective Oct. 1, 1971, and replaced by CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., PENAL CODE

art. 7, §45.
69. New York has limited capital punishment to two strictly defined cases: (1) where
the victim was a peace officer, (2) where the defendant was confined to prison at the time
of the crime. Only if one of these situations exist, and the defendant is more than 18
years old and "there are no substantial mitigating circumstances" is a penalty proceeding
authorized. Otherwise, the sentence is life imprisonment. N.Y. PENAL LAw §125.35 (McKinney 1967).
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4701 (1963).
71. In Texas the judge assesses the punishment in capital cases under a bifurcated
procedure. However, if "the state has made it known in writing prior to trial that it will
seek the death penalty" or "the defendant so elects in writing at the time he enters his
plea in open court," the jury determines the punishment under a bifurcated procedure.
Tx. CODE Cram. PROC. art. 37.07 (2) (b) (1969).
72. Ga. Laws 1970, Act of March 27, 1970, No. 1333, at 949.
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with which to determine punishment.73 The procedure these states have
adopted is known variously as the bifurcated, split-verdict, or two-stage trial.74
Basic-ally, the procedure provides for two 75 separate proceedings, one to determine guilt or innocence and, if the defendant is found guilty, a second to
76
determine punishment.
Under a bifurcated system guilt is determined in the same manner as it
is under a unitary system. After determining guilt, if the jury is unable to
reach a unanimous 77 verdict on the penalty to be imposed, the judge may
empanel a new jury solely on the punishment issue or sentence the defendant
to life imprisonment. 78 When the court is sitting without a jury, either because a jury has been waived79 or because a guilty plea has been entered,
the judge usually has discretion to sentence the defendant either to life imprisonment or to death.80
73. Bifurcation also attempts to eliminate problems inherent in policies allowing for
the liberal admissibility of background evidence during trial. See note 66 supra. An additional purpose of bifurcation is to allow the defendant to present mitigating evidence
without being prejudiced on the issue of guilt. See notes 60-66 and accompanying text
supra. In addition to the aforementioned states, the Uniform Code of Military Justice has
adopted a bifurcated procedure. PROCEDURE FOR CouRs-MARTrA, ch. XIII, §§75-77 (1969).

In addition, the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (see ROYAL COMM'N ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 1949-1953 REPORT 194-207
(1965)), the American Law Institute (see MODEL
PENAL CODE §210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)), and the Florida Commission on Capital
Punishment (see REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ABOLITION OF DEATH
PENALTY IN CAPITAL CAsEs 38-40, 42 (1965)), have all recommended its implementation.
74. Some states use a bifurcated procedure where sanity is in issue. See generally Louisell & Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, 49 CAIF L. REv. 805 (1961).
In addition, the concept of bifurcation has been suggested for civil cases. See generally
Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the Questionable
Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND L. REv. 831 (1961).
75. In California, if sanity is in issue in a capital case, the trial may be "trifurcated."
See Note, The California Penalty Trial, 52 CALIF. L. Rxv. 386, 387 n.8 (1964).
76. In addition to the six states that have adopted a bifurcated procedure, South
Dakota provides that if the defendant is found guilty of murder "the trial judge may ...
require the jury again to retire" to consider the question of mercy. S.D. CoMPimD LAws
ANN. §22-16-13
(1967). See generally Note, supra note 75, at 386; Note, The Two-Trial
System in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 50 (1964); Note, supra note 47, at 628.
77. All six states require the jury to be unanimous in its penalty decision. CAL. PENAL
CODE §190.1 (West 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. §64-10 (1960); Ga. Laws 1970, Act of March 27,
1970, No. 1333, at 949; N.Y. PENAL LAw §125.35 (McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§4701 (1963); TEx. CODE CalM. PROc. art. 37.07 (1969).
78. CAL. PENAL CODE §190.1 (West 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. §53-10 (1960); N.Y. PENAL
LAw §125.35 (5) (McKinney 1967). In Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4701 (1963), and
Georgia, Ga. Laws, 1970, Act No. 1333, if the court discharges the jury because it is of
the opinion that further deliberation will not result in unanimity, the sentence is automatically imprisonment. Texas provides: "In the event the jury shall fail to agree, a mistrial
shall be declared, the jury shall be discharged, and no jeopardy shall attach." TEX. CODE
CiM.
PROC. art. 37.07 (1969). See also Galloway v. Beto, 296 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
aflf'd, 421 F.2d 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 912 (1970).
79. In New York a defendant may not waive a jury trial in capital cases. N.Y. CONsT. art.

I, §2.
80.
STAT.

CONN. GEN. STAT. §64-10 (1960); N.Y. PENAL LAw §125.35 (McKinney 1967); PA.
ANN. tit. 18, §4701 (1963); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07 (1969). In California, if
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Ordinarily, the jury that decides the guilt issue also decides the punishment to be imposed; however, New York and California provide that for
"good cause," the judge may empanel a new jury for the penalty trial."' While
New York provides that the judge may direct a sentence of life imprisonment
upon completion of the guilt determination phase,8 2 California courts have
determined that the judge must review the evidence upon completion of
both phases of the trial and may then reduce the penalty from death to life
imprisonment. 3 In addition, California has held that the bifurcated procedure is mandatory84 and cannot be waived.8 5
Because one of the primary purposes of the bifurcated trial is to enable
the jury to make an informed determination of punishment, all six states
provide for the liberal admissibility of evidence during the penalty phase.
86
New York, the most liberal, provides for the introduction of evidence:
[B]y either party on any matter relevant to sentence including, but
not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the crime, defendant's
background and history, and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Any relevant evidence, not legally privileged shall be received
regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence.
Pennsylvania, on the other hand, takes a much more restrictive view of the
scope of admissibility and allows only' evidence of the defendant's "prior
convictions, confessions or admissions.' 7
California, the first state to institute a bifurcated procedure,8 8 has accumulated a significant body of case law relating to the admissibility of
evidence during the penalty phase. The California experience indicates a
tendency to determine evidentiary requirements on a case-by-case basis rather
than by statutory enactment. Statutorily, California provides that evidence
"of the circumstances surrounding the crime, of the defendant's background
and history,89 and of any facts in aggravation or mitigation of -the penalty" 90
a defendant pleads guilty, a jury is empaneled on the penalty question. If the jury is waived,
the judge determines the punishment. CAL. PENAL CoDE §190.1 (West 1969).
81. CAL. PneAL CODE §190.1 (West 1969); N.Y. PEaNAL LAW §125.85 (McKinney 1967).
See People v. Carter, 56 Cal. 2d 549, 573 n.10, 364 P.2d 477, 491 n.10, 15 Cal. Rptr. 645,
659 n.10 (1961).
82. N.Y. PENAL- LAw §125.30 (McKinney 1967).
83. In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 623, 447 P.2d 117, 124, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21,28 (1968).
84. People v. King, 240 Cal. App. 2d 389, 49 Cal. Rptr. 562, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 293

(19 ).
85.

People v. Shipp, 59 Cal. 2d 845, 382 P.2d 577, 31 Cal. Rptr 478, cert. denied, 377

U.S. 999 (1963).
86. N.Y. PENAL LAw §125.35 (3) (McKinney 1967).
87. Commonwealth v. McCoy, 405 Pa. 23, 31, 172 A.2d 795, 798 (1961). See also United
States v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 622, 627-29 (3d Cir. 1963). See generally 110 U. PA. L. Ra,.

1036 (1962).
88. California has been using a bifurcated procedure since 1957. See CAL. PENAL CoDE
§190.1 (West 1969).
89. See, e.g., People v. Nye, 71 Cal. 2d 356, 455 P.2d 395, 78 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1969); People
v. Hill, 66 Cal. 2d 536, 426 P.2d 908, 58 Cal. Rptr. 340, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 911 (1968).
90. CA1. PENAL CODE §190.1 (West 1969).
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may be introduced. However, California courts have engrafted the requirements of competency9 ' and relevancy 92 upon the evidence to be admitted
during the penalty phase. 93 Consequently, traditional rules precluding hearsay evidence 9- remain in effect. 95
The California courts have also had to define the admissibility of prior
crimes committed by the defendant on an ad hoc basis. Generally, evidence
of a defendant's prior criminal record,9 6 including specific acts of misconduct, 9 7 is admissible in the penalty phase. While it is not necessary for the

defendant to have been prosecuted 9s or convicted 9- of the previous offenses,
prior acts of misconductoo and prior crimes 0' must be proved beyond a
0 2
reasonable doubt before the jury will be allowed to consider them.
In other areas the California courts have limited the scope of admissibility in an effort to maximize individualized punishment. Consequently, evidenceo 3 or argument'04 relating to the effectiveness and social or moral implications of the death penalty are inadmissible. 0 5 Similarly, evidence of the
91.

People v. Purvis, 52 Cal. 2d 871, 883-84, 346 P.2d 22, 28-29 (1959).

92. People v. Hill, 66 Cal. 2d 536, 426 P.2d 908, 58 Cal. Rptr. 340, cert. denied, 390
U.S. 911 (1967).
93. Id. These requirements also apply to arguments to the jury. People v. Bandhauer,
66 Cal. 2d 524, 426 P.2d 900, 58 Cal. Rptr. 332, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 878 (1967).
94. People v. Hines, 61 Cal. 2d 164, 174, 390 P.2d 398, 405, 37 Cal. Rptr. 622, 629 (1964).
95. For an example of California's resort to ad hoc judicial determinations to delineate
the scope of admissible evidence see People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P.2d 33, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 201 (1964), rev'd on other grounds, 70 Cal. 2d 702, 452 P.2d 601, 75 Cal. Rptr. 385
(1969).
96. People v. Robillard, 55 Cal. 2d 88, 100, 358 P.2d 295, 302, 10 Cal. Rptr. 167, 174
(1960).
97. Ward v. State, 269 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1959). Prior offenses may be proved
by competent documentary evidence, People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1061, 1094, 458
P.2d 479, 499, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 587 (1969), or by evidence of the actual circumstances
surrounding the prior crime. See, e.g., People v. Teale, 70 Cal. 497, 520, 450 P.2d 564, 579,
75 Cal. Rptr. 172, 186 (1969).
98. People v. Nye, 71 Cal. 2d 356, 367, 455 P.2d 385, 401, 78 Cal. Rptr. 467, 473 (1969).
99. People v. Aikens, 70 Cal. 2d 369, 372, 450 P.2d 258, 260, 74 Cal. Rptr. 882, 884
(1969).
100. People v. Tahl, 65 Cal. 2d 719, 738, 423 P.2d 246, 257, 56 Cal. Rptr. 318, 329,
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 942 (1967). But see People v. Coleman, 71 Cal. 2d 1159, 1168, 459
P,2d 248, 254, 80 Cal. Rptr. 920, 926 (1969).
101. People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1061, 1093, 458 P.2d 498-99, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567,
586 (1969).
102. See, e.g., People v. Varnum, 66 Cal. 2d 808, 815, 427 P.2d 772, 777, 59 Cal. Rptr.
108, 113, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 529 (1967). Consequently, extrajudicial admissions of prior
crimes are inadmissible in the absence of corroborating evidence, People v. Hines, 61 Cal.
2d 164, 174, 390 P.2d 398, 405, 37 Cal. Rptr. 622, 624 (1964), unless the corpus delecti of
the earlier crime can first be established, People v. Varnum, 66 Cal. 2d 808, 815, 427 P.2d
772, 777, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108, 113, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 529 (1967).
103. People v. Kidd, 56 Cal. 2d 759, 770, 366 P.2d 49, 55-56, 16 Cal. Rptr. 793, 800
(1961).
104. People v. Love, 56 Cal. 2d 720, 733, 366 P.2d 33, 39, 16 Cal. Rptr. 777, 782 (1961).
105. But see People v. Welch, 58 Cal. 2d 271, 274, 373 P.2d 427, 429, 23 Cal. Rptr. 363,
365 (1962); People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 156, 367 P.2d 680, 692-93, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40,

52-53 (1961).
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possibility of parole,0 8 and evidence to show that the Governor is authorized
to reduce death sentences to life imprisonment o7 are also inadmissible.
The California experience makes it clear that any evidentiary proceeding that attempts to elucidate as many considerations and circumstances as
does the bifurcated trial penalty phase requires a case-by-case determination
of the scope of admissibility. In the final analysis, however, it must be noted
that the jury makes the ultimate decision as to which evidence, if any, is
significant and relevant. The jurors need not consider any of the aggravating
or mitigating evidence that has been introduced.18 Rather, they have absolute discretion and may base their penalty determination on any factor at
all.109
BIFURCATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Federal Decisions
The United States Supreme Court has twice considered the constitutional
requirements relating to bifurcated trials.:1 0 In Spencer v. Texas,"' a capital
case involving an habitual offender statute, the defendant contended that
due process required exclusion of evidence of prior convictions because such
evidence was prejudicial on the issue of guilt."1 2 In order to obviate this
infirmity, defendant argued that a two-stage jury trial was required in order
that evidence of past crimes might only be introduced after the verdict was
rendered."1 The Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that the
106. People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P.2d 33, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964).
107. Id.
108. People v. Feldkamp, 51 Cal. 2d 237, 241, 381 P.2d 632, 634 (1958).
109. In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 625, 447 P.2d 117, 123, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 27 (1968).
See also McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); Spencer v. Texas, 385 US. 554
(1967). But see Model Penal Code discussion in text accompanying notes 182-194 infra.
110. A third United States Supreme Court decision that indirectly deals with bifurcation
is United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). In Jackson the Federal Kidnapping
Act, 18 US.C. §1201 (a) (1964), was held unconstitutional because those defendants that
demanded a jury trial risked the death penalty, while those pleading guilty or waiving a
jury trial faced a maximum punishment of life imprisonment. The Government, however,
urged a different interpretation of the statute and argued: "[A] defendant cannot avoid
the risk of death by attempting to plead guilty or waive jury trial. For even if the trial
judge accepts a guilty plea or approves a jury waiver, the judge remains free . . . to
convene a special jury for the limited purpose of deciding whether to recommend the
death penalty." Id. at 572. The Court rejected this contention that the statute authorized
a bifurcated procedure and held the "inevitable effect" of the statute was to chill the
fifth amendment right to plead not guilty and the sixth amendment right to a jury trial.
Id. at 581. See also Jackson v. Denno, 378 US. 368 (1964) (holding that the voluntariness
of a confession must be determined at a proceeding separate from the trial).
111. 385 U.S. 554 (1967). Spencer involved three consolidated cases, only one of which
was a capital offense.
112. Id. at 563. See text accompanying notes 60-66 supra. Florida's habitual offender
statute, FLA. STAT. §775.11 (1969), has been cured of the defect alleged in Spencer. See
Shargaa v. State, 102 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1958) (holding that prior convictions can only be
introduced after conviction or sentence for the subsequent felony).
113. 385 US. at 564-65.
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possibility of some collateral prejudice to the defendant does not render
the unitary proceeding unconstitutional.11 The Court further stated: 1 5
To say that the two-stage jury trial . . . is probably the fairest, as
some commentators and courts have suggested, and with which we
might well agree were the matter before us in a legislative or rule
making context, is a far cry from a constitutional determination that
this method of handling the problem is compelled by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In McGautha v. California,"" the most recent and comprehensive decision involving bifurcated trials, the Supreme Court once again rejected the
contention that the Constitution requires two-stage trials. McGautha involved
two defendants, both of whom had been found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. McGautha, who had been tried under California's bifurcated procedure, argued that his constitutional rights had been infringed
because the jury "impose[d] the death penalty without any governing
standards.""'7 Crampton, the co-defendant in McGautha, who had been tried
under Ohio's unitary procedure, made the same argument and further contended that a bifurcated trial was constitutionally required."1s
The Court rejected the argument that the absence of sentencing standards
was "lawless" and violative of due process, 19 by noting that "history reveals
continual efforts, uniformly unsuccessful, to identify before the fact those
homicides for which the slayer should die."' 20 The Court did not contend
that sentencing standards were not preferred, but rather that they were impossible to formulate and implement.1
The second issue, that the Constitution required bifurcated trials, was
raised only by Crampton. He argued that because he had a constitutional
right not to be a witness against himself and a constitutional right to be
heard on the punishment issue,122 an "intolerable tension between constitutional rights"'123 was created by his unitary trial. That is, he had to waive
24
one right in order to assert the other.1
114. Id. at 564.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 567-68.
402 U.S. 183 (1971).
Id. at 185.
Id.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 197.

121. "To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their
perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in
language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear
to be tasks which are beyond present human ability." Id. at 204. Apparently, the drafters
of the Model Penal Code believe otherwise: "We think ...
that it is within the realm of
possibility to point to the main circumstances of aggravation and of mitigation that
should be weighed and weighed against each other when they are presented in a concrete
case." MODEL PENAL CODE §201.6, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). See notes 182-194
and accompanying text infra.
122. See note 131 infra.
123. 402 U.S. at 211.
124. The Court couched the issue in these terms: "[Whether it is consistent with the
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The Court Tejected "the suggestion that a desire to speak to one's sentencer unlawfully compels a defendant in a single-verdict capital case to
incriminate himself"'125 by analogizing to other constitutionally acceptable
procedures that require defendants to make a choice. 26 The Court concluded
that "the policies of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination are
not offended when a defendant in a capital case yields to the pressure to
testify on this issue of punishment at the risk of damaging his case on
Having decided that the Constitution is not violated when a defendant
"yields to the pressure" and testifies, the Court next considered the opposite
situation "in which a defendant remains silent on the issue of guilt and
thereby loses an opportunity ,to address the jury personally on [the issue of]
punishment."' 28 The Court concluded that this situation was not unconstitutional because Ohio "takes a lenient view" as to the admissibility of background evidence and will admit evidence that has "at best a tenuous connection to the issue of guilt."' 29 Consequently, the only limiting effect of
the unitary trial, as opposed to a bifurcated trial, was that the defendant
was deterred "from bringing to the jury's attention evidence peculiarly
within his own knowledge."'' 0 The majority did not find this distinction of
constitutional significance. 31

privilege [against self-incrimination] for the State to provide no means whereby a defendant
wishing to present evidence or testimony on the issue of punishment may limit the force
of his evidence (and the State's rebuttal) to that issue." Id. at 213-14.
125. Id. at 216.
126. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 US. 78 (1970); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554,
561 (1967), and text accompanying notes 60-66 and 111-115 supra (defendants who elect
to testify may be impeached by evidence of prior convictions); United States v. Calderon,
348 U.S. 160, 164 & n.1 (1954) (defendants whose motion for acquittal at end of government's case is denied must decide whether to put on a defense and risk bolstering the
government's case).
127. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 217 (1971).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 219. The Court further stated: "The Ohio Constitution guarantees defendants the right to have their counsel argue in summation for mercy.... The extent
to yhich evidence going solely to the issue of punishment is admissible under Ohio law
is unclear, see Ashbrook v. State, 49 Ohio App. 298, 197 N.E. 214 (1935) [see note 28 supra]
but.., as the present case illustrates, an accused can put before the jury a great deal of
background evidence . . . ." McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 219 (1971). Justices
Douglas and Brennan, on the other hand, interpreted Ohio law differently: "On the issue
of mercy, viz., life imprisonment rather than death, petitioner under Ohio law was banned
from offering any specific evidence directed only toward a claim of mercy. Ashbrook v. State,
49 Ohio App. 298, 197 N.E. 214." Id. at 228.
180. Id. at 220.
131. Id. Two dissenting opinions were filed in the instant case. The first, written by
Mr. Justice Douglas and joined in by Justices Brennan and Marshall, relied primarily on
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). In Simmons the Court held that an intolerable tension between constitutional rights was created "when a defendant testifies in
support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds" and faces the
possibility that his testimony will be admitted against him during the trial if his motion
is denied. Id. at 394. Douglas, applying Simmons to McGautha, reasoned: "Mhe consti-
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While the McGautha holding is broad, several constitutional arguments
were never discussed. Although the court briefly mentioned United States
v. Jackson,13 2 it made no attempt to apply that decision to the instant case.
In Jackson the court struck down a federal statute "not [because] it necessarily coerce[d] guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply [because] it needlessly encourage[d] them." 133 Applying Jackson to the unitary trial, it may
be argued that the opportunity to present mitigating evidence only by waiving a jury or pleading guilty "needlessly encourages" jury waivers and guilty
pleas and chills the right of the accused to assert his innocence before a
4
jury.13
Similarly, none of the opinions discussed the relationship between bifurcation and the equal protection clause, although Justice Brennan alluded
135
to it.
In Sims v. Eyman, 3 6 however, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit was confronted with the issue of whether equal protection is violated when evidence relevant to punishment is inadmissible
during a jury trial, but admissible if a jury is waived or a plea of guilty
is entered.13 7 The court dismissed defendant's argument by reasoning that
the classifications did not foster "invidious discrimination" and "futhermore,
138
whatever 'discrimination' exist[ed] in the procedure [was] very minor.'
The most important question unanswered by McGautha is "whether or
to what extent the concept of due process of law requires that a criminal

tutional right to be free from the compulsion of self-incrimination may not be exacted as
a condition to the constitutional right to be heard." McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,
24041 (1971). The constitutional right to be heard on the issue of punishment has not,
however, been established according to the majority opinion. Id. at 218. Mr. Justice

Brennan also filed a dissent. He argued general due process requirements and concluded:
"Not once in the history of this Court, until today, have we sustained against a due process

challenge such an unguided, unbridled, unreviewable exercise of naked power." Id. at 252.
182. 890 U.S. 570 (1968). See note 110 supra.
133. 890 U.S. at 583.
134. See Note, Discriminatory Sentencing and the Unitary Trial: Two Areas for Application of the United States v. Jackson Rationale, 31 U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 118, 124-27 (1969).
See also Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968).
135. Justice Brennan stated: "[Tjhere is a substantial difference between the evidence
that may be considered by a jury and that which may be considered by a sentencing panel
of judges .... [T]he defendant may, in a jury trial . .. not . . .present evidence relevant
solely to the question of penalty. A defendant who is to be sentenced by a panel of
judges, on the other hand, has an absolute right before the sentencing decision becomes
[W]here, as here, no
final to address the sentencers on any subject he may choose ....
basis whatsoever is presented to justify the difference, it is inexcusable." McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 294 (1971). See also Perkins v. State, 228 So. 2d 382, 394-95 (Fla.
1969) (concurring opinion).
186. 405 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1969).
137. Id. at 443-44. See also In re Ernsts' Petition, 294 F.2d 556 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 917 (1961).
138. 405 F.2d at 444. Sims is somewhat distinguishable from the Florida situation because "Arizona [has] constitutionally determine[d] . . . that the punishment for first degree
murder shall fit the particular crime rather than the individual criminal." Id. at 443, while
Florida has taken the opposite position - that punishment should fit the particular individual rather than the crime. Davis v. State, 123 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1960).
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defendant wishing to present evidence or argument presumably relevant to
the issues involved in sentencing should be permitted to do so."' 39 While
expressly noting that the answer to this question has never been "directly
determined, ' 40 the court refused to resolve this issue in the present case
because both defendants had had the opportunity to present some background evidence during the trial.241 Consequently, the extent to which
McGautha is applicable to states such as Florida, where evidence directly
relating to punishment is inadmissible, is unclear. Nevertheless, an analysis
of recent Florida decisions indicates that the issue left unanswered by McGautha has in fact been resolved in this state.
Florida Decisions
Florida's position on bifurcation is tenuous but dear. While the Florida
supreme court has expressly noted the importance of individualized punishment142 and has refused to overturn a lower court procedure closely resembling a bifurcated trial, 14 3 it has held that the constitution does not
require separate determinations of guilt and penalty nor guidelines for the
jury's recommendation of mercy. 4
In Craig v. State 43 the defendant was convicted of rape146 and moved
for a reduction of sentence from death to life imprisonment.4r One of the
139. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 218 (1971).
140. Id.
141. See note 129 supra.
142. See Davis v. State, 123 So. 2d 703, 711 (Fla. 1960). See also Morgan v. State, 142 So. 2d
308, 310 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1962).
143. See Lee v. State, 166 So. 2d 131 (1964). In Lee, the appellants were indicted for
first degree murder and subsequently entered guilty pleas. "With the stage set for the final
act in the trial, the receipt of testimony of the homicide and the determination of the
punishment to be inflicted at the discretion of the judge, he introduced unusual, and, so
far as we know unprecedented, procedure when he empaneled a jury of 12 men to render
a verdict on the lone question whether or not mercy should be recommended reducing
the penalty from death to life imprisonment." Id. at 132. Subsequently, the jury refused to
recommend mercy. The court stated: "Under the law the responsibility for determining
[punishment] was strictly the judge's and there was no power vested in him to delegate
that burden to a jury . ... [Nevertheless] the fact remains that after the testimony of
the witnesses had been heard the judge decided independently, though his conclusions
may have been strengthened by the verdicts, that no mercy should be shown . . .. 'Although we do not encourage the procedure followed by the trial judge, we do not find
such an abandonment by him of his power and duty as would warrant a conclusion that
reversible error as distinguished from irregularity transpired." Id. at 133.
144. See Campbell v. State, 227 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1969); Wilson v. State, 225 So. 2d 321
(Fla. 1969); Craig v. State, 179 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1969) (Ervin & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). See
also Baker v. State, 225 So. 2d 327, 329 (Fla. 1969) (holding that Florida's mercy statute is
not void for vagueness despite the fact that it fails to "set out standards to govern a mercy
recommendation').
145. 179 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1965).
146. The defendant was convicted under FLA. STAT. §794.01 (1969), which provides
that a defendant found guilty of rape shall be sentenced to death unless a majority of the
jurors recommend mercy, in which case the sentence is life imprisonment.
147. 179 So. 2d at 204. The defendant moved foi a reduction of sentence under Fla.
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grounds urged for reversal of the lower court's refusal to reduce sentence
was that Florida's single verdict trial procedure violated the due process
clause because the jury had unlimited and undirected discretion in imposing
the death penalty. 148 In a per curiam opinion the court dismissed appellant's contention holding that "on the merits we find that the circuit judge
ruled correctly in sustaining the validity of the [mercy] statute against the
attack made upon it."'149
In a vehement dissent, Justice Ervin agreed with appellant, arguing
that "a two-stage procedure is necessary to give the statute constitutional
operation"'5 ° and noted that modern concepts of criminology emphasize individualized punishment.' 5 '
In Campbell v. State,' 52 another decision involving Florida's mercy statute, the Florida supreme court expressly held for the first time that evidence relevant solely to punishment is inadmissible in capital cases. 5 3 Appellant sought to introduce evidence of a mental defect short of legal insanity,
arguing that such evidence was "relevant to the question of whether to
recommend mercy."' 54 While noting that appellant's argument did have
"appeal," the court ruled the evidence inadmissible, saying:55
[SJo long as the courts of this state are bound to follow the one-stage
trial proceeding... such evidence is inadmissible as having a tendency
to confuse the jury in its determination of the question of the guilt of
the accused.
Notably, the court did not criticize the bifurcated procedure nor did it
suggest that rational sentencing is best accomplished by excluding evidence
relevant to punishment. Rather, the court questioned its authority to implement a two-stage procedure. 156 Such doubt, however, does not appear warranted in light of the Florida constitution's mandate that "the practice and
procedure in all courts shall be governed by rules adopted by the supreme
court."1

57

Stat. §921.24 (1969), which has since been repealed. However,

FLA.

R. CrM. P. 1.800 pro-

vides for a similar procedure.
148. 179 So. 2d at 204.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 207 (dissenting opinion).

151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 206 (dissenting opinion).
227 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1969).
Id. at 877.
Id.

155. Id. But see Henderson v. State, 20 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. 1945).
156. In Craig v. State, 179 So. 2d 202, 208 (Fla. 1965) (dissenting opinion), Justice
Ervin noted: "The division of the two issues at the trial is a matter of procedure, within
the province of the judiciary to prescribe inasmuch as the Legislature . . . has not conclusively prohibited separate consideration of them by the jury."
157. FLA. CONST. art. V, §3. See generally Note, The Rulemaking Power of the Florida
Supreme Court: The Twilight Zone Between Substance and Procedure, 24 U. FLA. L. REV.
87 (1971).
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In Wilson v. State,""" the Florida supreme court again upheld the constitutionality of the unitary procedure. In Wilson the defendant had been
found guilty of murder and, with no recommendation of mercy, was sentenced
to death.15 9 He argued that Florida's mercy statute violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment because it failed "to set up any standards to guide jurors in determining whether or not to recommend mercy."'3.e
In dismissing appellant's claim, the court actually bolstered his contention
by concluding: "[W]hatever criticisms may be made of the absence of such
standards, such would not embrace matters prejudicial to the defendant on
61
trial, as each juror is free to vote for mercy for any reason at all."'
Interestingly, the court in Wilson described the function of the jury under the present mercy statute in such a way as to suggest a bifurcated proce1 2
dure: 6
First, a determination must be made of the existence of facts which
render the accused guilty of the crime charged. That having been done
there is the consideration of the existence of facts which would warrant
[a recommendation of mercy].
The court made it dear that the mercy statute contemplates separate considerations of the issues of guilt and penalty. 3 However, while the court
implied otherwise, the facts that can be considered by the jurors on the
guilt question are necessarily the only facts they can consider on the penalty
question.
In addition to the Florida judiciary, the legislature has also rejected
the concept of bifurcation. In 1963 a special commission was appointed by the
president of the Florida Senate to study the abolition of the death penalty
in capital cases.' 8 ' While the commission ultimately recommended that the
death penalty be maintained, it unanimously agreed that the Florida Legislature should adopt a bifurcated -trial procedure in capital cases. 65 While
it is not apparent what action, if any, was taken regarding the commission's
report, a bill requiring bifurcation was introduced in the Florida Senate in
1965.186 The procedure was to be applicable in all capital cases and was similar in most respects to the bifurcated procedure currently employed in the
states that have adopted it. The bill, however, died on the Senate calendar8r
and apparently no further action was taken.
158. 225 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1969).

159. Id. at 322. See note 9 supra.
160. 225 So. 2d at 322.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 324 (emphasis added). Accord, State v. Culver, 253 F-9d 507 (5th Cir. 1958).
225 So. 2d at 524.
See also North v. State, 65 So. 2d 77, 100 (Fla. 1952) (on petition for rehearing)

wherein the court concedes that "it is true that there is a difference" between the question
of guilt and the question of mercy.
164. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-362, Fla. S.28.
165. REPORT OF THE SPECmA COMMISSION FOR THE STuDY or ABOLrrION or DE.TH PENALTY
IN CAPIrrAL CASES 3843 (1965).
166. Fla. S. 858 (1965).
167. FLA. S. JouR. 57 (Index 1965).
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One of the most strenuous indictments of the bifurcated procedure has
come from Chief Justice Burger while on the bench of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In Frady v. United
Statesl °8 he reiterated arguments previously raised at the 1959 District of
Columbia Judicial Conference:169
Such procedure would be troublesome, expensive and time consuming . . . [in addition] the introduction of aggravating background
evidence would work too harshly against the defendant, inflaming the
jury rather than providing a basis for dispassionate exercise of discretion.
While Justice Burger raised important questions, the thrust of his objection was directed at the method of implementation rather than the potential
efficacy of a bifurcated system. He concluded his opinion by admonishing
that the split verdict procedure would require "a major job of statute drafting." 170 This cautious attitude epitomizes the typical objection to the bifurcated trial. ' 1 Few observers have actually criticized the basic scheme of
bifurcation, but have instead objected to some of the procedural alternatives
that bifucation necessarily entails.172 Although there may be legitimate
foundation for specific criticism, it appears that most of the objections are
based upon theoretical disadvantages rather than upon proved deficiencies. 7 3
The charge that the bifurcated trial is too time consuming and consequently too costly has yet to be substantiated. While common sense dictates
that there will be some increase in the length of trials, the difference would
seem negligible.17 4 Moreover, it is logical to assume that separating the issues
of guilt and penalty will enable the jury to understand the issues more
clearly. 17i This in turn may lead to shorter jury deliberations and conse168. 348 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 909 (1965).
169. Id. at 115.
170. 'Id. at 116.
171. See Campbell v. State, 227 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1969); cf. State v. Mount, 30 N.J. 195,
152 A.2d 343 (1959).
172. Note, The Bifurcated Trial Procedure and First Degree Murder, 3 Suror U.L
REv. 628, 632 (1969).
173. While it has been noted that capital defendants rarely have mitigating evidence
to present, Note, The California Penalty Trial, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 386, 396 (1964), and that
"the prosecution has taken complete advantage of the penalty phase," Note, Executive
Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 136, 167 (1964), this situation can hardly
be characterized as a disadvantage of bifurcation. It must be emphasized that the bifurcated procedure is a vehicle for individualized punishment rather than simply a device
whereby defendants can avoid the death penalty.
174. The length of trials would be increased primarily by the introduction of evidence
and concluding arguments during the penalty stage. These combined factors would not
seem to require more time than the judge takes in conducting inquiries into mitigating
and aggravating circumstances, FLA. R. CiuM. P. 1.780, and in considering presentence
investigation reports, FLA. R. Curm. P. 1.790, both of which are applicable only in noncapital cases.
175. Cf. Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. Rxv. 968, 979 (1967).
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quently to shorter trials. Another factor that must be kept in mind is that
bifurcation is limited to capital offenses, which comprise less than one per
cent of all cases disposed of.'7 6 Similarly, when a defendant in a capital case
waives a jury, pleads guilty, or is found innocent in the guilt phase, two
stages will be unnecessary.
While the disadvantages of bifurcation are mainly procedural and speculative, the advantages are substantive and readily perceptible. The delegation of guilt and penalty determination to the jury necessarily implies
separate consideration of both issues.177 The bifurcated trial translates this
implication into a discernible legal reality. Under a bifurcated system jurors
will be better able to identify the issues and arrive at more meaningful conclusions. 78 In addition, separating the issues of guilt and penalty is likely
to lessen the possibility of jury nullification and jury bargaining. 79 Another
advantage of bifurcation is that it relieves the tension between the defendant's desire to testify and introduce character evidence and his right against
self-incrimination. 80 With the trial divided into two stages the defendant
can invoke the fifth amendment during the guilt stage without forfeiting
his right -to present mitigating evidence during the penalty stage. Similarly,
he can introduce favorable evidence during the penalty stage without facing
the probability that he will be rebutted with evidence damaging on the guilt
issue.' 8 '
Model Penal Code Approach. While at least one court has described the
penalty phase of the bifurcated trial as a "legal vacuum,''1 8 2 devoid of satisfactory standards as to what evidence is relevant to punishment,8 s this would
seem to be an indictment of overly broad legislation rather than the bifurcated trial per se. The Model Penal Code, however, demonstrates that the
bifurcated trial does lend itself to satisfactory comprehensive legislation.
Under the Model Penal Code convicted murderers face a sentence of either

176. In 1970, for all of the judicial circuits in Florida, a total of 119,572 cases were
disposed of. Of these, only 436 involved capital offenses. While it is not known exactly
how many of these capital cases ended in a jury trial, there were 1,052 criminal jury
trials, 2,660 civil trials, and a maximum of 251 capital trials in the circuit courts during
1970. JUDiIcL CoUNcm or FLORMA, SmnrEmTH ANNUAL REPORT 32-33 (1971).
177. See Wilson v. State, 225 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. 1969); text accompanying notes
162-163 supra.
178. Cf. Note, supra note 175, at 979.
179. By not instructing the jurors on-mercy until after they have rendered their verdict,
it is probable that fewer jurors will vote to acquit in the face of a possible death sentence
and that deals involving a promise to vote guilty in exchange for a promise to vote for
mercy will be minimized. See Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L.

Rxv. 50, 52 (1964).
180. See text accompanying notes 60-66 and 122-131 supra.
181. See Commonwealth v. McCoy, 405 Pa. 23, 29, 172 A.2d 795, 797 (1961).
182. People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137, 154, 390 P.2d 381, 392, 7 Cal. Rptr. 605, 616
(1964).
183. See Frady v. United States, 348 F.2d 84, 115-16 (P.., Cir. 1965) (Burger, I., con.
curring in part and dissenting in part).
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prolonged imprisonment or death.'84 Generally, the court is authorized to
impose a sentence of imprisonment if none of various specifically enumerated
aggravating circumstances8 5 were established at the trial and if they are
unlikely to be established at a further proceeding.1s 6 Similarly, if the evidence at the trial established substantial mitigating factors, 8 7 imprisonment
is again authorized. ss If, however, none of the enumerated criteria authorizing the judge to fix the sentence at imprisonment are present,8 9 a separate
proceeding is conducted to determine the penalty-death or imprison-

184. When a sentence of imprisonment is imposed for capital offenders the judge may
fix the minimum at not less than one year nor more than ten years, and the maximum at
life imprisonment. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§6.06, 210.6(1), (2) (Proposed Official Draft,
1962).
185. The Model Penal Code lists the following aggravating circumstances:
" (a) The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of imprisonment.
"(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
"(c) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another
murder.
"(d) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
"(e) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice
in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting
to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson,
burglary or kidnapping.
"(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
"(g) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
"(h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional
depravity."
Id. §210.6 (3).
186. Id. §§210.6 (1), (3).
187. The Model Penal Code lists the following mitigating circumstances:
"(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
"(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
"(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented
to the homicidal act.
"(d) The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant believed to
provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
"(e) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person and
-his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
" (f) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.
"(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication.
"(h) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime."
Id. §210.6 (4).
188. Id. §210.6 (1).
189. In addition to the absence of aggravating circumstances and the presence of
mitigating circumstances, the code lists other considerations that, if present, authorize the
judge to fix the sentence at imprisonment:
"(c) The defendant, with the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the approval of
the Court, pleaded guilty to murder as a felony of the first degree; or
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ment.190 At the second proceeding the traditional exclusionary rules of evidence are not in effect 91 and consequently the defense and prosecution are
afforded considerable latitude in presenting evidence on the penalty issue.192
The value of the Model Penal Code lies in its enumeration of specific
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Code effectively avoids the
criticism that the penalty phase is a standardless "legal vacuum." It accomplishes this by providing that the jury or the court, as the case may be, must
consider the enumerated factors and "shall not impose or recommend sentence
of death unless it finds one of the [enumerated] aggravating circumstances...
and further finds that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency."193 In essence, the Model .Penal Code demonstrates -that effective legislation can be drawn so as to provide perceptible,
but nevertheless flexible, standards for the penalty stage.'9
Witherspoon v. Illinois. Another advantage of the bifurcated trial manifests itself in the area of voir dire and the exclusion of jurors who are opposed -to the death penalty.1 95 In Witherspoon v. Illinois196 the United States
Supreme Court held:1 97
A sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or
recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply
because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.
"(d) The defendant was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime; or
"(e) The defendant's physical or mental condition calls for leniency; or
"(f) Although the evidence suffices to sustain the verdict, it does not foreclose all doubt

respecting the defendant's guilt."
Id. §210.6 (1).
190. Id. §210.6 (2).
191. Id. While hearsay evidence is admissible under this provision, "defendant's counsel

[must be] accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements." Id. In this respect
the Model Penal Code is similar to the New York statute, which also allows hearsay to be

introduced. N.Y. PENAL LAW §125.5 (3) (McKinney 1967).
192. The Model Penal Code provides that during the penalty proceeding, "evidence
may be presented as to any matter that the Court deems relevant to sentence, including
but not limited to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's character,
background, history, mental and physical condition and any of the [enumerated] aggra-

vating or mitigating circumstances [see notes 185, 187 supra] .... Any such evidence which
the Court deems to have probative force may be received, regardless of its admissibility
under the exclusionary rules of evidence .... The prosecuting attorney and the defendant
or his counsel shall be permitted to present, argument for or against sentence of death."
MoDEL PENAL
193. Id.

COD

§210.6 (2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).

194. See note 121 supra.
195. See Note, supra note 179, at 54-57.
196. 391 US. 510 (1968).
197. Id. at 522. While the defendant in Witherspoon sought to have his conviction
overturned on the ground that the death qualified jury was conviction prone, Id. at 516,
the Court made it clear that its holding only invalidated the sentence, not the verdict. 14,
at 523 n.21.
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The Court did, however, point out that jurors who say they would automatically vote against the death penalty regardless of the evidence and
jurors whose attitude toward capital punishment would color their decision
on the question of guilt, could be excluded.19s
Since the decision in Witherspoon several studies have been published
indicating that Witherspoon-qualified juries tend to be conviction prone.1 99
By dismissing veniremen opposed to capital punishment only from the penalty
phase, the bifurcated trial would appear to be the most likely device to deal
with this inequity. A defendant's right ,to an impartial jury would be better
assured by allowing jurors who would never vote to impose the death
penalty to sit in on the guilt phase.
Admittedly, the bifurcated trial is not a panacea. A juror opposed to
capital punishment might vote to acquit knowing that if the defendant is
found guilty he will be replaced by a juror who may vote for death during
the penalty phase. Although as a practical matter it would appear that this
situation would seldom arise, the problem could be avoided by not informing jurors that they will be replaced until after they had rendered a verdict.
Moreover, by making use of alternate jurors200 as substitutes in the
penalty phase, there would be little, if any, difference in time or cost. This
would also avoid having jurors participate in the penalty phase who had
not been present to hear the evidence during the guilt phase.
Individualized Punishment. The most obvious and compelling advantage
of the bifurcated trial is that it enables individualized and enlightened sentencing. Florida judges have long recognized the importance of presentence
investigation reports in noncapital cases. 201 It would be unrealistic and naive
198. 391 U.S. at 522 n.21. Apparently within one of these two exceptions Florida has
statutorily provided that persons having beliefs that would preclude them from finding
a defendant guilty of a crime punishable by death are not qualified as jurors in capital
cases. FLA. STAT. §913.13 (Supp. 1970). However, as the Court in Witherspoon noted, citing
Piccott v. State, 116 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1960), as an example, many states in practice exclude
"jurors opposed to the death penalty even in the absence of a showing that their scruples
would have interfered with their ability to determine guilt in accordance with the evidence and the law." Witherspoon v. State, 391 U.S. 510, 513-14 n.5 (1968).
199. See, e.g., Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the
Death-Qualified Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1
(1970); Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jury Bias, and the
Use of Psychological Data to Raise Legal Presumptions, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIV. Lns. L.
REv. 53 (1970); Jurov, New Data on the Effect of a "Death Qualified" Jury on the Guilt
Determination Process, 84 HARv. L. REy. 567 (1971). But see Survey, The Death Qualified
Jury Shall Live, 1 U.S.F.V.L. REV. 253 (1968).
200. See FLA. R. GRIM. P. 1.280.
201. In a very recent Florida study involving judges from criminal courts of record
and circuit courts, the following question was asked: "Do you personally use a presentence
investigation report?" Every participating judge replied in the affirmative -that he uses
such reports "at least most of the time." In addition, "all judges responding thought that
the presentence investigation report was of considerable importance in formulating the
sentence and the information therein was usually weighted heavily in reaching the decision
regarding the sentence." Note, Appellate Review of Sentences in Florida: A Proposal, 23 U.
FLA. L. REV. 736, 755 (1971).
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to suggest that capital offenders merit less investigation on the sentencing
question.
While the legislature has manifested an intent that all capital offenders
should not suffer the death penalty,- 2 they have failed to give jurors the
means necessary to adequately carry out this mandate. Consequently, individualized punishment is nonexistent in capital cases despite the fact that
most experts consider individualization a prerequisite to rational sentencing.203 The United States Supreme Court has stated: 204
Highly relevant - if not essential - to [the] selection of an appropriate
sentence is the possession-of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics.
By limiting -the jury to evidence gleaned from the trial on the issue of
guilt, Florida has perpetuated an antiquated procedure that approximates sentencing by chance and ignores the concept of individualized punishment.
CONCLUSION

In Davis v. State,20 5 a 1960 capital case, the Florida supreme court artic20 6
ulated an enlightened sentencing policy for the courts of this state:
Crime must be punished but it is the consideration of the individual
that should determine the kind of treatment appropriate to his case.
Responsibility should be the basis of punishment, and individualization the criterion of its application; such is the formula of modern
penal law.
While this pronouncement may be "the formula of modern penal law,"
it is not, unfortunately, the formula of modem Florida law. In those capital
cases in which the jury determines punishment, consideration of the crime,
rather than the individual, is the basis for determining penalty. As long as
background evidence is inadmissible and jurors are forced to base penalty
determinations solely on evidence relevant to guilt, it can hardly be said
20
that sentencing in Florida evolves around "consideration of the individual."
Although legal commentators generally agree that retribution is no

202. See note 9 supra.
203. See, e.g., R. SALEILmr, THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT (1968).
204. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
205. 123 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1960).
206. Id. at 711. See also Morgan v. State, 142 So. 2d 508, 312 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962)
(stating that "in order to arrive at a just and fair sentence . . . the judge must regard the
total person....).
207. Al jurisdictions do not believe that punishment should fit the individual: "Endeavoring to make the punishment fit the crime, a Cleveland judge recently gave . . . a
rather unusual sentence. The crime: calling a policeman a pig. The sentence: three hours
in a pig pen." St. Petersburg Times (Fla.), July 25, 1971 (Parade Magazine), at 4.
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longer a valid objective of criminal punishment, 208 this appears to be the underlying concept inherent in Florida's capital sentencing procedure.209 A
sentencing policy that emphasizes the facts of the crime as opposed to the
background of the individual can be said to embrace a philisophy of vengeance: 1 0
A penal system based simply upon private vengeance or communal
retribution has no need for refined sentencing procedures. Once guilt
has been determined, the punishment flows inexorably and uniformly,
whether it be an eye for an eye or twenty years for larceny.
This observation accurately characterizes unitary procedures in general and
Florida's capital sentencing procedure in particular.
If the mandate of Davis is to truly become Florida's sentencing policy
and if the individual is to become the controlling factor in determining punishment, Florida must institute a bifurcated procedure. The only realistic
disadvantage of bifurcation, that it will slightly increase the length of some
capital trials, should not prevent its adoption. Former Chief Justice Warren
has noted that "while justice should be administered with dispatch, the
essential ingredient is orderly expedition and not mere speed." 211 When a
human life is at stake the inconvenience that results from slightly lengthier
trials must give way to rational and humane procedures.
Similarly, the fact that bifurcation is not constitutionally required should
not stand in the way of its implementation. Although Florida's unitary procedure is constitutional under the due process clause, constitutional require212
ments are best viewed as minimum standards rather than ultimate goals.

Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority in McGautha, noted: 213

208. See, e.g., M. BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW AND rrs PROCESSES 13-14 (1969); S.RUBIN,
THE LAw OF CRIMINAL CORRiON 654-56 (1963).
209. Clearly, Florida's capital sentencing procedure does not embrace a rehabilitative
philosophy. By eliminating evidence relevant to punishment, jurors are unable to realistically assess the accused's potential, or lack of potential, for rehabilitation. Similarly, it is
questionable whether Florida's unitary procedure embodies a deterrent philosophy. A jury
that is unable to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances is logically precluded
from determining whether imprisonment will suffice as a deterrent in a given case or whether the particular circumstances call for capital punishment. A second aspect of the deterrent philosophy, that capital punishment will deter others from committing capital
crimes, has yet to be substantiated. Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALIF. L. REv.
1268, 1302 (1968). Moreover, if the overriding policy behind Florida's unitary procedure is
deterrence, why allow jurors to recommend mercy at all?
210. Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REv. 968, 976 (1967).
211. Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10 (1959).
212. "If the pace of procedural improvement in the administration of criminal justice
must march always to the measure of the Constitution, progress may be slower than it need
be. The great office of the Constitution in this area is to set minimum standards. It does
not forbid the ingenuity in procedural improvisation which it could not command." Frady v.
United States, 348 F.2d 84, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (concurring opinion).
213. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 221 (1971).
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BIFURCATING FLORIDA'S CAPITAL TRIALS

The Federal Constitution... does not guarantee trial procedures that
are the best of all worlds, or that accord with the most enlightened
ideas of students of the infant science of criminology, or even those
that measure up to the individual predilections of members of this
court.
A necessary prerequisite to the implementation of a bifurcated system
is the dear enunciation of those specific factors and policy considerations
that are deemed relevant ito rational capital sentencing. 214 Merely bifurcating
Florida's capital trials will not insure rational and individualized sentencing.215 Clear standards are necessary to insure consistent sentencing and to
give the defendant notice of those factors the jury will consider in its pen6
alty determination.2
Once standards are promulgated, the scope of admissible evidence must
be clearly defined. This will minimize the resort to ad hoc judicial determinations that California has experienced. 21 7 Similarly, the legislature must

214. At present, Florida jurors are given limited instruction in this area. Florida
Standard Jury Instruction 2.14 states: "Provisions for probation, parole, pardon or reduction of sentence of convicted persons are a part of the laws of this State. These laws are
administered by public officials as authorized by the law. The question of whether mercy
should be recommended is to be determined by you in a fair and impartial manner and
the question of whether the defendant would be subject to such procedures after conviction
is a matter which you should not consider or discuss in connection with any recommendation
of mercy." THE SuPREmE CouRT Co
=rrrxa
ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL
CAss, FLoRmA STANDARD JuRY INSmUcrIONS FOR CRMmNAL CAsES 43 (1970). See also McGautha
v. California, 402 US. 183, 291-95 (1971) (dissenting opinion); Note, Due Process and
Sentencing: From Mapp to Mempa to McGautha, 49 TExAs L. Rav. 25, 40-48 (1970). For
an empirical study of what factors jurors actually do consider in determining punishment
see Note, A Study of the CaliforniaPenalty Jury in First-Degree Murder Cases, 21 STAN. L.

RPv. 1297 (1969).
215. Compare Wilson v. State, 225 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1969), with In re Anderson 69
Cal. 2d 613, 447 P.2d 117, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1968). In McGautha v. California, 402 Us.
183, 291 (1971) (dissenting opinion), Justice Brennan noted that the lack of standards was
as much an infirmity of the bifurcated trial as it was of the unitary trial.
216. Sentencing standards can take one of two possible approaches. The jury can be
instructed that they "may" or "should" consider certain factors or, as the Model Penal
Code provides, that they "must" consider certain factors. See notes 182-194 and accompanying text supra. The value of the Model Penal Code approach is that it would enable
more consistent sentences.
217. See notes 88-109 and accompanying text supra. It must also be determined if the
formal rules of evidence will be applicable during the penalty phase. It may well be, as one
commentator has suggested: "[T]o admit incompetent, uncorroborated evidence, even if
relevant, would undermine the statutory intent [of bifurcation] because it would lessen
the probability of a reasoned determination of punishment." See generally Note, The Bifurcated Trial Procedure and First Degree Murder, 3 SuFFOLK U.L. Rav. 628, 633 (1969);
Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 50, 63-73 (1964). On the
other hand, it should be noted that judges are not limited by strict rules of evidence when
they are the sentencer. See Zuniga v. State, 184 So. 2d 659 (Ist D.CA. Fla.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 962 (1966). Perhaps the best approach is the one adopted by the Model
Penal Code. The Code allows evidence to be introduced regardless of its admissibility under
the exclusionary rules of evidence "provided that the defendant's counsel is accorded a fair
opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements." MODEL PENAL CODE §210.6(2) (Proposed
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choose between those procedural alternatives2 1s that bifurcation necessarily entails. 219 And finally, it must be determined to what extent the penalty stage
2
is reviewable. The time has come for Florida to adopt a bifurcated procedure. The
antiquated unitary trial is an anomaly in the criminal procedure of this
state; justice will best be served if its death knell is sounded. Florida's capital defendants deserve a better fate than a system that approximates sentencing by lot and is as just as trial by combat.
ERIC
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Official Draft, 1962). This condition requires only that defendant's counsel "be seasonably
informed of the factual contents and conclusions stated in any reports that will be used."
Id. §201.6.
218. While it has been assumed that new legislation is required before the bifurcated
procedure can come into existence, Justice Ervin has stated: "It does not require new
legislation to inaugurate the two-stage procedure. . ..

The . . . statutes . . . do not pre-

clude the jury from considering separately the issues of guilt and mercy recommendation.
... Craig v. State, 179 So. 2d 202, 207-08 (Fla. 1965) (dissenting opinion). Even if
new legislation is required (and, in any event, new legislation is certainly preferrable),
Justice Ervin believes the supreme court has the power to institute such a procedure under
its rulemaking power. See note 156 supra. However, in light of the language in Campbell
v. State, 227 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1969), see text accompanying notes 152-157 supra, it is
doubtful that the court will invoke its rulemaking power. See generally Note, supra note 157.
219. For example, it must be determined if Florida should adopt a New York procedure whereby the judge has the power to direct a sentence of life imprisonment upon
completion of the guilt stage. N.Y. PENAL LAw §125.30 (McKinney 1967). One commentator
has perceptively noted: "Since facts sufficient to warrant a directed verdict of life imprisonment by a judge would probably lead a jury to impose the same sentence . . . [this procedure] has the practical effect of saving the time and expense of a probably unnecessary
second trial." Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 50, 59 (1964).
220. Florida presently provides that "appeals from final judgments imposing the death
penalty," FLA. STAT. §924.08 (Supp. 1970), may be taken as "a matter of right." FLA. STAT.
§924.05 (Supp. 1970). Presumably, this would remain the same under a bifurcated system.
There are basically two procedural alternatives that can be employed if error is found
in the penalty phase. The case can be remanded with directions to impose a sentence of
imprisonment, see N.Y. PENAL LAW §125.35 (6) (McKinney 1967), or the case can be remanded with directions to impose a sentence of imprisonment or convene a new penalty
trial. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1181 (7) (West 1969). In no event, however, should the guilt
of the defendant be retried if error is found only in the penalty stage.
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